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A Dynamic General Equilibrium Framework 
of Investment with Financing Constraint
DANYANG XIE and CHI-WA YUEN*
In this paper, we provide a dynamic general equilibrium framework with an explicit
investment-financing constraint. The constraint is intended as a reduced form to
capture the balance sheet effects that have been widely regarded as an important
determinant of financial crises. We derive a link between the value of a firm and
social welfare. Using this link, we show the somewhat surprising possibility that the
value of a firm can be greater with the constraint. Our model also sheds light on
how the effects of productivity shocks and investors’misperception of productivity
shocks may be amplified by the financing constraint. [JEL C61, D92]
A
t the very beginning of the Asian financial crisis, most people took it to be
yet another currency crisis and many saw it as the second generation (self-
fulfilling) type à la Obstfeld (1996) rather than a first generation (fundamental)
type à la Krugman (1979). As the crisis unfolded, however, it became obvious
that, unlike exchange rate crises, the Asian financial crisis was more related to
banking and financial problems in financing business investment. Since then,
quite a few theories (so-called “third generation” models) have been proposed to
explain its sources—moral hazard or guaranteed bailouts (Krugman, 1998),
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1See Schneider and Tornell (2000) for an attempt to synthesize some of these effects.As Krugman (2002) concludes, balance sheet effects are now believed to be
the most crucial element behind the Asian financial crisis. In particular, if firms
are highly leveraged with debt denominated in foreign currency, then anything
that triggers a massive capital outflow will result in a depreciation of the domes-
tic currency and thus an increase in the firms’ debt burden. As a consequence,
net worth of the firms will be reduced, limiting their ability to borrow to finance
new investment. The resulting investment and output collapse will validate the
capital flight and make the crisis self-fulfilling.
Despite its general acceptance by the profession as an important determi-
nant of financial crises, the balance sheet effect has been studied mostly in
models with complicated banking structure and multiple types of agents. For
studies of firms’ balance sheet effects on the business cycle, see Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). For a growth analy-
sis that incorporates banks’ balance sheet effects, see Chakraborty and Ray
(2001). The balance sheet effect has also been included in the study of the bank
capital channel of monetary policy (see Van den Heuvel, 2001; Kashyap and
Stein, 1995; and Chami and Cosimano, 2001). A related set of papers that
emphasize the role of durable assets as collateral include those of Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) and Chen (2001).
In this paper, we present a dynamic general equilibrium framework with an
infinitely long-lived representative agent. We impose an explicit investment-
financing constraint that is intended as a reduced form to capture the balance
sheet effects. At the expense of microfoundations, our approach has the advan-
tage of simplicity. We think of our contribution as similar to that of the money-
in-utility-function (MIUF). The MIUF complements the cash-in-advance (CIA)
and the overlapping-generation (OLG) models of money with more microfoun-
dation. The lasting influence of MIUF is clearly seen in its wide adoption in the
recent open economy macroeconomics literature (see Obstfeld and Rogoff,
1996). It is certainly our hope to see a future adaptation of our investment-
financing constraint to real business cycle models, but as a first step, we focus
on a continuous-time and deterministic setting.
In this setup, we derive a link between the value of a firm and social wel-
fare. We find that the value of a firm can be greater with the constraint. Our
model also sheds light on how the effects of productivity shocks and investors’
misperception of productivity shocks may be amplified by the financing con-
straint. We also discuss shocks such as accounting scandals that worsen the
information asymmetry and shocks that enhance transparency, such as improved
accounting standards and disclosure rules.
I. The Model
Consider an infinite horizon economy where capital is the only factor of pro-
duction. The representative household is endowed with some initial stock of
capital, k0. Using this capital stock, the household sets up a representative firm
to produce output and to invest in new capital. The firm’s output net of invest-
ment will be distributed back to the household to support its consumption.
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The Firm’s Value Maximization Problem
At any time t, the firm uses capital, kt, to produce output, f(kt), and invests an
amount, k
•
+δ k (where δ is the depreciation rate). The firm’s problem is to choose
k
•





where z is net investment. The superscript o stands for original, emphasizing the
situation without an investment-financing constraint. Implicitly, we are assuming
that the firm borrows funds from banks at a competitive interest rate rt to finance
its investment. A more explicit discussion about the role of the banking sector in
this model economy is contained in Appendix I. 
The first-order conditions of this problem imply the familiar interest rate
expression as follows:
(1)
The Consumer’s Utility Maximization Problem
The consumer’s problem is simply to choose consumption, {ct}0
∞ , to maximize util-
ity subject to the budget constraint that the present value of her consumption can-
not exceed the value of the firm she owns, i.e.,
Implicit in the budget constraint is the assumption that the household is the sup-
plier of loanable funds (via the bank at the competitive interest rate, r) to help
finance the firm’s investment. 
The first-order condition implies that 
(2)
Equilibrium Condition
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∞ − ∫ ∫ max δLinking the Firm Value and the Consumer Utility
Proposition: The value of the firm is linked to the welfare of the representative
consumer:
(4)
Remark: The superscript o is purposely omitted here because the relation still
holds even in the presence of market distortions. The key equations for establish-
ing the link are (2) and (3). The proof is given in Appendix II and a closed-form
example is given in Appendix III. In general, the computation of the value of the
firm requires a numerical procedure, which can be found in detail in Xie and Yuen
(2002). The procedure has two steps. First, the policy function, co(k), is computed
in the method of Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991). Then the policy function is
used to solve, backwards, a differential equation for Vo(k) from the steady state.
Equation (4) has an interesting and surprising implication, namely, when
σ≥ 1, the value of the firm can be greater in an economy with market distortions
than without. To illustrate, let us use x ˜ to denote variable x under market distor-
tions. Suppose that market distortions induce a consumption profile, {c ˜t}0
∞ , that is
flatter than the socially optimal one, {ct
o}0
∞ . In other words, c ˜0 >c0
o,b ut the rate of
growth is lower under market distortions. Since social optimality implies that
Uo(k0)>U ˜(k0), equation (4) clearly shows that V ˜(k0)>Vo(k0) when σ≥ 1.
So what is the intuition behind the possibility of higher firm value despite the
fact that social welfare is necessarily lower in the presence of market distortions?
Note that the value of the firm is the present value of the consumption stream;
hence, it depends on the real interest rates. Equation (2) can be rewritten as 
where gc is the rate of growth of consumption. Therefore, whenever market dis-
tortions lower consumption growth, they will also lower real interest rates. The
greater the value of σ (namely a lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution),
the larger the decline in the real interest rate in order to be consistent with the
lower consumption growth. This large decline in the real interest rate could raise
the present value of the firm under market distortions above its level under the
social optimum. 
One example of such market distortions would be a combination of an output
tax and a lump-sum subsidy. In this paper, we focus on another type of distortion,
namely, the presence of an investment-financing constraint. 
II. Investment-Financing Constraint
We now examine a case in which the representative firm’s investment is limited
by its ability to obtain financing. We assume that there is an implicit, competi-
tive banking sector that provides loans (at the real interest rate rt) to finance the
rg c =+ ρσ ,
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277firm’s investment no more than some fraction of its net present value, namely,
k
•
+δ kt≤γ V(kt) for any t.
There could be many reasons why the firm might not be able to borrow an
amount greater than a fraction of its fundamental value; in particular, capital mar-
ket imperfections such as default possibilities and asymmetric information prob-
lems (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999.) This financing constraint can be
viewed as a reduced-form representation of these imperfections that we do not
explicitly model in this paper.




δ k+z ≤γ V(k)
k0 given,
and W ≡ V. This problem can be solved as follows. Given any continuous and
almost everywhere differentiable function V, the maximization problem is well
defined and a function W can be obtained. We can write W=T(V), where T is a
mapping. Our task is to find the fixed point of T.
A rigorous investigation of the problem is the subject of an entirely different
paper. For instance, to prove the existence of a fixed point, we would need to show
that T is a contraction mapping. Modification of the standard argument in dynamic
programming would be required, but what is essential in the proof of contraction
mapping is the presence of discounting in the objective function: ρ >0 in a con-
tinuous time model and 0<β <1 in a discrete time model. Instead, we approach
the problem in an intuitive fashion. First, we use the special case of f(k)=Akα with
0<α =σ <1 to derive a special feature of the fixed point. Then we construct a
value function V displaying the same feature in more general cases when
f(k)=Akα ,w here α≠σ .
To begin, note that in the absence of the financing constraint, explicit functional
forms of the investment function Io(k) and the firm’s value function Vo(k) are avail-
able when α =σ . We can see that Io(k) is hump-shaped, starting with Io(0)=0,
increasing and reaching a maximum, then declining and approaching negative
infinity as k goes to infinity. Vo(k) is an increasing function starting with Vo(0)=0
and approaching infinity as k goes to infinity. Furthermore, we have,
Clearly, if γ is large, namely γ≥ρ /(1–σ ), then Io(k)–γ Vo(k)≤ 0 for any k; hence
the financing constraint will never be binding. Let us focus on small γ instead:
γ<ρ /(1–σ ). With a small γ , we see that there exists a critical capital stock, kc,
Ik Vk A k kk A k
Ak k
oo ( )− ( ) =−
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278such that Io(kc)–γ Vo(kc)=0 and the financing constraint is only binding when k<kc.
The existence of a critical kc is also true in more general cases when f(k)=Akα ,
where α≠σ . A proof is given in Appendix IV where such a fixed point, V,f or the
mapping T is constructed. We now turn to a numerical example. 
III. A Numerical Example
In our numerical example, we assume the following benchmark parameter val-
ues: α =0.36, σ =0.5, γ = 0.015, δ = 0.1, A = 12, and k0= 20. We first compute the
consumption function, the value function, and the investment function,
co(k),Vo(k), and Io(k), respectively, in the absence of the financing constraint by
shooting backward from k* to k0. Then we use Io(k)=γ Vo(k) to solve for the crit-
ical value kc. The corresponding functions c(k), V(k), and I(k) in the presence of
the investment-financing constraint can be obtained by shooting backward from
kc to k0 for k ∈ [k0,kc] (when the constraint is binding) and combining it with
co(k), Vo(k), and Io(k) (when the constraint is nonbinding). The graphs for γ V(k)
with and without the financing constraint as well as the investment function Io(k)
are displayed in Figure 1. 
Not surprisingly, investment under the financing constraint is forced to be lower
than Io(k) when k<kc. Since contemporaneous output is unaffected by changes in
investment, c(k)>co(k) for k<kc (see Figure 2, panel 2). Also note that even when
σ =0.5, we still find V(k)>Vo(k) for k<kc. This example shows that when the con-
sumption profile is flatter under market distortions than under the social optimum,
the condition σ≥ 1 is sufficient for V(k)>Vo(k) but it is not necessary. 
Given these functions, c(k), V(k), and I(k), we are ready to compute the time
path of consumption (Figure 2, panel 1). We see that while consumption under the
financing constraint initially exceeds its unconstrained counterpart, it grows at a
slower rate and is soon surpassed by the latter.2
Given the consumption path, the real interest rate can be computed using
equation (2), which holds with and without the financing constraint. As shown in
Figure 3, panel 2, initially the interest rate is significantly lower with the invest-
ment constraint than without it. The constraint induces a jump in the interest rate
from 4 percent to 5 percent at the time when the capital stock hits its critical value
and gradually converges to its steady-state value of 3 percent thereafter. 
The interest rate behavior under the financing constraint may suggest a partial
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2Observe that while the “constrained” consumption function lies everywhere above its “uncon-
strained” counterpart, the same is not true for the consumption paths. This is because capital (of which
consumption is a function) will grow more slowly with the constraint than without it. The same logic
applies to comparisons between policy functions of other variables and their corresponding time paths.countries. In particular, the interest rate functions as portrayed in Figure 4 indicate
that while a 10-fold difference in capital stocks between rich and poor countries
(say, k=20 versus k=200) could induce a more than 13-fold difference in their
interest rates (r(20)= 0.535 versus r(200)= 0.0455) in the absence of the con-
straint, the interest rate gap will be significantly reduced to 4-fold (r(20)= 0.188
versus r(200)= 0.0455) under the constraint. It may sound tautological that the
presence of a financing constraint reduces the interest rate differential across coun-
tries. In fact, the statement could be given an empirical content if one could cali-
brate the parameter γ to obtain a quantitative measure of the reduction in interest
rate differential. The remaining differential could then be attributed to other fac-
tors such as political risk and institutional and trade barriers.
IV. Discussion and Possible Extensions
Our simple model can be easily extended to include labor as an additional input in
the firm’s production technology and the labor-leisure choice in the consumer’s
utility maximization problem. This extension would allow us to examine the effect
of the financing constraint on employment as well—especially when the constraint
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Figure 3. Capital and Real Interest Rate Pathsdoes not apply just to investment financing, but also to hiring workers and footing
their wage bills. In the presence of this more severe constraint, employment and
output could both be adversely affected so that consumption might not surge at the
beginning despite the fall in investment.
This model is cast in a deterministic framework. The following discussion
about its potential applications to cases with uncertainty is thus only suggestive.
• An increase in total productivity, A, will shift both the γ V(k) and I(k) schedules
upward. The impact on investment is not a monotonic function of the capital
stock. As shown in Figure 5 based on our numerical computations, the impact on
investment is hump-shaped. This suggests that in emerging market economies,
broadly interpreted as countries with capital somewhere between that of the less-
developed and the developed countries, investment is more responsive to pro-
ductivity shocks than in the rest of the world.
• In a deterministic framework, it is easy to detect any discrepancy between V, the
investors’perception of a firm’s net worth, and W, the net worth based on funda-
mentals. In a stochastic world, there will always be a discrepancy between the
two. Misperception can last for some time despite incoming data when capital
stock is in a region where the investment constraint is binding. For example,
when an important innovation such as the Internet raises total productivity (cap-
tured by parameter A in our model), no one knows exactly the new value of A. 
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Figure 4. Interest Rate FunctionsIf the market estimate, AM, is higher than the true A, the increased valuation of
the firm’s net worth will relax the financing constraint and allow the firm to raise
its investment above the equilibrium level. As a result, output will be higher,
which partially justifies the rise in market estimate AM. Because it may take some
time for the investors to gauge the real impact of the innovation and because the
calculation of the fundamental value W involves projection of future profits, the
discrepancy between W and V may not be statistically detectable for a number of
years. Only when subsequent earnings reports of the firm consistently reveal that
V is significantly above W would AM be revised downward. Again, no one knows
precisely how much downward revision is warranted for AM. Doubtless in well-
functioning markets, investors’profit incentive would lead AMto settle around the
true A in the long run; but in the short run, overshooting can occur on either the
upside or downside whenever an important innovation in general-purpose tech-
nology comes on the scene. The magnitude of investment fluctuations depends
on the level of the capital stock. Figure 6 indicates investment would be more
volatile in emerging market economies than in the rest of the world. To be sure,
a logically consistent model of business cycles would require an explicit proba-
bility specification of the magnitude and the dynamics of misperception.
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Figure 5. Change in Productivity•T he recent accounting scandals in the United States, such as those involving
the Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc., would lower the value of γ ,r esulting in
tighter financing constraint and hence lower aggregate investment. The con-
gressional effort to tighten government regulations by raising accounting
standards and making CEOs more accountable to shareholders will likely
stop γ from sliding further and thus should stabilize investment. In a full-
fledged real business cycle (RBC) model with investment constraint, the
parameter γ should be calibrated to changes in government regulation and
supervision in financial markets. For instance, China’s increasing effort since
1996 to adapt its financial markets to international standards in preparation
for its accession to the World Trade Organization will allow banks to raise γ
in their decision to provide loans to the private sector, thereby raising private
investment. Even in the absence of technical progress, therefore, institutional
changes that ease the problem of asymmetric information in the financing
process would mean a higher γ and a less stringent financing constraint. As a
result, capital can be accumulated more rapidly; and as the capital stock
passes the financing threshold, the investment volatility discussed in the para-
graph above will eventually become more moderate. 
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Figure 6. Misperception: Optimism and Pessimism• As implied by the discussion above, both technological progress and institutional
improvement can raise investment and output. Traditional RBC models do not
distinguish one change from the other. Accounting separately for the change in
A and the change in γ requires serious effort in gathering and examining relevant
empirical data—such as the trust indicator reported in Knack and Keefer (1997)
and the survey data on bank regulation and supervision in Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2001). For a developing country trapped in low investment, the priority
for policy changes is likely to be different, depending on whether the low invest-
ment is caused by a low A, in which case importing advanced technologies and
ideas would help, or a low γ , in which case rules and regulations improving the
transparency of business transactions are called for. In the sense of Prescott
(1986), here again, “theory is ahead of business cycle measurement.”
A more rigorous analysis of these issues is left for future research. 
APPENDIX I
A More Detailed Description of the Banking Sector in Discrete Time
At time zero, the household uses its initial capital, k0, to purchase shares of the firm and thus
becomes its owner. With k0, the firm produces f(k0), which it pays to the household as dividends. It
then borrows I0from the bank at the competitive interest rate r0to finance its investment. When time
1 comes around, the capital stock grows to k1= I0+(1–δ )k0, yielding output  f(k1). After repaying
principal and interest to the bank, the residual f(k1)–I0(1+r0) is paid out to the household. A new
loan is then secured to finance investment I1 at interest rate r1. At time 2 the capital stock
k2= I1+(1–δ )k1 generates output f(k2) and dividend f(k2)–I1(1+r1). And so on and so forth.
Therefore, the value of the firm equals the present value of the net cash flow, i.e.,
The household receives f(kt)–It–1(1+rt–1) from the firm as its shareholder and It–1(1+rt–1)
from the firm as its debt holder, consumes ct=f(kt)–St, and deposits its savings, St, with the
bank. In equilibrium, supply of loans by the household, St, equals demand for loans by the firm,





from (3) and rs from (2) into the firm’s value function, we have,
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286APPENDIX III
A Closed-Form Example
In the particular case when f(k)=Akσ we have c(k)=[ρ +(1–σ )δ ]k/σ (see Xie, 1991). Therefore,
where, with k
•






Construction of a Fixed Point
For any given V(k), the first-order conditions in the firm’s problem are given by
and
where λ and θ are the multipliers associated with k
•
=z and the financing constraint, respec-
tively, and θ satisfies the following complementary slackness condition:
θγ δ Vk k k () −− [] = ˙ 0.
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287The consumer’s problem remains the same as before. Therefore, equation (2) still holds and
equation (4) holds with W in place of V:
(7)
Differentiating (7) with respect to τyields,
(8)
When k≥ kc the financing constraint is not binding, so θ=0 and the policy and value functions
are the same as in the unconstrained case described in Xie and Yuen (2002), with c(k)=co(k),
W(k)=V(k)=Vo(k), etc. 
In what follows, we shall focus on the case where the constraint is binding, i.e., k< kc and
θ>0. Is there a differential equation that governs c(k)? From equation (3) and the binding con-
straint, we have
Differentiate this with respect to t. Making use of equations (2) and (8) and imposing V ≡ W,
we obtain
which implies that
We can compute c(k) by working backward from kc and c(kc)=co(kc).
Once c(k) is computed, V(k) can be found from the financing constraint simply as
The fact that we make use of equation (8) and impose W≡ V in our derivation of c′(k) above
ensures that this V(k) is the fixed point of the mapping T. Hence the function V that we con-
struct here is the value function of the firm.
Vk A k ck () =− () []
α γ .
′ () = ()
− () () + []
+
+ () () − ()
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Ak c k V k α γ − () = () .
′ () = () − () Wk k r W k c k ˙ .
Wk c e c d t t
t ττ
σ ρτ σ
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1 .
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